True, they would (on the basis of what I understand as your interpretation), but why not then use (a fortiori) 2 and 1&3, i.e.:
2 destroys God's Simplicity while 1&3 (emphasized in 3) preserves it?
That's fine.
After thinking about this I went back to review
The Triads and this caught my eye:
[The human mind] will attain to that light, and will become worthy of supernatural vision of God, not seeing the Divine Essence, but seeing God by a revelation appropriate and analagous to Him.
I.iii
My emphasis. Aquinas, when he considers the knowledge of God that is attainable by human reason, considers the importance of analogical meaning of words derived from man's knowledge of sensible things.
See the ST
Prima pars Q. 15 art 5:
I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly.
Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term wise applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term wise applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term wise is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Aquinas continues:
Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Emphasis added.
JPII gives a good example by considering what Fatherhood in God must be:
In itself, [God's] "generating" has neither "masculine nor "feminine" qualities. It is by nature totally divine. It is spiritual in the most perfect way, since "God is Spirit" and possesses no property typical of the body, neither "feminine" nor "masculine". Thus even "fatherhood" in God is completely divine and free of masculine bodily characteritistics.
While I appreciate Palamas' point that it is impossible to comprehend God, and hence for theosis there must be some "revelation" analogous to Him by which man attains to theosis, Aquinas is not unaware of the difficulty. In Q. 12 art. 7 ST, Prima pars he states:
I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Sermon 37).
In the
Summa Contra Gentiles Bk Three, Part I he states:
Now, the final limit to which contemplation can reach is the divine substance. Hence, the mind which sees the divine substance must be completely cut off from the bodily senses, either by death or by ecstacy.
Palamas states:
And what am I to say of this union...disengaged by ecstacy from all perception of the senses or intellect, admitted to the true vision because they ceased to see...
The difference between Palamas and Aquinas seems to be in this:
One says that God is utterly incomprehensible and we reach God in theosis by an analogy. The other says that through analogical terms, man can come to some very limited knowledge about God in this life, and yet in final union man "sees" the essence of God, without comprehending it. No that's theosis!
Aquinas has this in his favor:
For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face.
1 Corinthians 13.
And don't forget the distinct praise given to Aquinas by
Gennadios Scholarios which I have mentioned in other threads.
I would also argue that Aquinas has
The Canticle of Canticles in his favor which is about the real union of the lover and the beloved. Finally, I would say that he has the Incarnation in his favor.
Interestingly enough, Aquinas himself shortly before his death, was taken up into this ecstacy. After his vision which was purportedly on the Feast of St. Nicholas, he gave up writing and said that compared to what he had seen, everything he had written was but straw. How amazing for one who, as man with great faith, holiness and learning, understood so much about Scripture, theology and philosophy.
