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The difference is that "and" does not do nearly as good a job of underlining the role of the Father as the Origin of the Trinity as does "through" (Aquinas admitted both, but, as elexie's friend commented, theologians can err in terms of emphasis and Aquinas's perspective talks past that of the East, prior to or after Palamas - who is, by the way, a saint recognized by Rome today as well).

For the East, "and" suggests the heresy of two Sources of Origin of the Spirit - and Rome itself would condemn that as heresy. It is a bad expression for perspectives outside of the scholastic one.

Both Churches agree that the manner of procession of the Spirit is different from the manner of begetting of the Son -it is just that we cannot know the difference and, on the basis of that unknowable difference alone, the Spirit is distinct from the Son.

the real issue is whether the procession of the Spirit is through the Son from all eternity and within the Trinitarian communion of love or whether the procession of the Spirit through the Son is in terms of the economy of God's revelation.

So, if I understand things correctly, the real issue is whether the procession of the Spirit is through the Son from all eternity and within the Trinitarian communion of love or whether the procession of the Spirit through the Son is in terms of the economy of God's revelation.

My understanding is that the Orthodox position rejects any notion of the Spirit proceeded from/or through the Son from all eternity, but that the Spirit, who proceeds from the Father alone from all eternity, is manifested, sent forth, through the Son when Jesus bestows the Holy Spirit on the Church, from the Father. Is this basically the real issue? Because if it is the issue, then I don't see eastern and western theologies as compatible. In the Orthodox faith, we deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son from all eternity, the Son being either a primary or secondary cause. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone from all eternity, but is then, in God's economy, given to us through the Son (hence the legitimacy of the expression "through the Son"). I don't see this as compatible with latin theology.

Joe

2. It is extremely important, in my judgment, to clarify the point concerning the "source" (πηγή) or "principle" or "cause" (αιτία) in the Holy Trinity. This is crucial perhaps decisive. The document of the Vatican sees no difference between the monarchia of the Father, i.e. the idea that the Father is the sole "principle" in God's Trinitarian being, an idea strongly promoted by the Greek Fathers, and St. Augustine's expression that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father "principaliter". However, before we can come to the conclusion that the two traditions, Eastern and Western, understand this matter in the same way, we must raise the following questions:

a) Does the expression "principaliter" necessarily preclude making the Son a kind of secondary cause in the ontological emergence of the Spirit? The Filioque seems to suggest two sources of the Spirit's personal existence, one of which (the Father) may be called the first and original cause (principaliter), while the other one (the Son) may be regarded as a secondary (not principaliter) cause, but still a "cause" albeit not "principaliter".

The discussions both at the time of St. Photius and at Lyons and Florence-Ferrara seem to have paid special attention to this delicate point. It is not accidental that the Greek theologians ever since the time of Photius insisted on the expression: μόνος αίτιος ο Πατήρ i.e. the Father is the sole cause of the Son as well as of the Spirit. This concern does not seem to be fully covered by the Augustinian expression principaliter. The second Council of Lyons is unclear on this matter when it says that the Father as Father of His Son is "together with Him the single principle from which the Spirit proceeds".

b) In the light of this observation it would be important to evaluate the use of the idea of cause (αιτία) in Trinitarian theology. It was not without reason that the Cappadocian Fathers introduced this term next to the words πηγή and αρχή (source and principle) which were common since St. Athanasius at least both in the West and in the East.

The term "cause", when applied to the Father, indicates a free, willing and personal agent, whereas the language of "source" or "principle" can convey a more "natural" and thus impersonal imagery (the homoousios was interpreted in this impersonal way by several people in the fourth century). This point acquires crucial significance in the case of the Filioque issue.

In the Byzantine period the Orthodox side accused the Latin speaking Christians, who supported the Filioque, of introducing two Gods, precisely because they believed that the Filioque implied two causes--not simply two sources or principles--in the Holy Trinity. The Greek Patristic tradition, at least since the Cappadocian Fathers, identified the one God with the person of the Father, whereas, St. Augustine seems to identify Him with the one divine substance (the deitas or divinitas).

It is of course true that, as the Vatican document points out, the Fourth Lateran Council excludes any interpretation that would make divine substance the source or cause, of the Son's generation and the, Spirit's procession. And yet the Cappadocian idea of "cause" seems to be almost absent in the Latin theological tradition.

As Saint Maximus the Confessor insisted, however, in defence of the Roman use of the Filioque, the decisive thing in this defence lies precisely in the point that in using the Filioque the Romans do not imply a "cause" other than the Father. The notion of "cause" seems to be of special significance and importance in the Greek Patristic argument concerning the Filioque. If Roman Catholic theology would be ready to admit that the Son in no way constitutes a "cause" (aition) in the procession of the Spirit, this would bring the two traditions much closer to each other with regard to the Filioque.

c) Closely related to the question of the single cause is the problem of the exact meaning of the Son's involvement in the procession of the Spirit. Saint Gregory of Nyssa explicitly admits a "mediating" role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit from the Father. Is this role to be expressed with the help of the preposition δία (through) the Son (εκ Πατρός δι'Υιού), as Saint Maximus and other Patristic sources seem to suggest? The Vatican statement notes that this is "the basis that must serve for the continuation of the current theological dialogue between Catholic and Orthodox". I would agree with this, adding that the discussion should take place in the light of the "single cause" principle to which I have just referred.

3. Another important point in the Vatican document is the emphasis it lays on the distinction between επόρευσις (ekporeusis)and processio. It is historically true that in the Greek tradition a clear distinction was always made between εκπορεύεσθαι (ekporeuesthai) and προείναι (proeinai), the first of these two terms denoting exclusively the Spirit's derivation from the Father alone, whereas προείναι (proienai) was used to denote the Holy Spirit's dependence on the Son owing to the common substance or ουσία (ousia) which the Spirit in deriving from the Father alone as Person or υπόστασις (hypostasis) receives from the Son, too, as ουσιωδώς (ousiwdws) that is, with regard to the one ουσία (ousia) common to all three persons (Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor et al). On the basis of this distinction one might argue that there is a kind of Filioque on the level of ουσία (ousia), but not of υπόστασις (hypostasis).

However, as the document points out, the distinction between εκπορεύεσθαι (ekporeuesthai) and προείναι (proeinai) was not made in Latin theology, which used the same term, procedere, to denote both realities. Is this enough to explain the insistence of the Latin tradition on the Filioque? Saint Maximus the Confessor seems to think so. For him the Filioque was not heretical because its intention was to denote not the εκπορεύεσθαι (ekporeuesthai) but the προείναι (proeinai) of the Spirit.

This remains a valid point, although the subsequent history seems to have ignored it. The Vatican statement underlines this by referring to the fact that in the Roman Catholic Church today the Filioque is omitted whenever the Creed is used in its Greek original which contains the word εκπορεύεσθαι (ekporeuesthai).

The per filium (through the Son) is not a solution to the present theological problem, because the Latin understanding of it and the Byzantine understanding of it are not the same.

Thus, when I speak of the per filium as a Byzantine Christian I am referring to the shining forth of the Spirit through the Son as energy, which manifests the consubstantial communion of the three divine persons (cf. the "Tomus of the Blachernae Council" of A.D. 1285, which condemned the Latin teaching of Lyons II), but this has nothing whatsoever to do with the Spirit's procession (ekporeusis) of origin as person from the Father alone.

In other words, two distinct realities are involved in this discussion for a Byzantine Christian: (1) the procession of origin (ekporeusis) of the Spirit as person, which is from the Father alone, and not from the Son (cf. St. John Damascene, "De Fide Orthodoxa," Book I, Ch. 8); and (2) the shining forth of the Spirit as energy (cf. St. Athanasios, "Ad Serapionem," I, 20), which involves the manifestation of the Spirit from the Father through the Son. Sadly, this doctrinal distinction is not made by the Latins; and so, the appearance of agreement actually hides a fundamental theological disagreement between the two sides.

To put it another way, when the Spirit is manifest through the Son, He does not move through the Son as person, but only as divine energy, and -- as a consequence -- He (i.e., the Spirit) does not receive His subsistent being or His co-essential nature through (or from) the Son; instead, He receives His existence and nature from the Father alone, Who is the sole cause, source, principle, and origin of divinity.

In conclusion, I -- as a Byzantine Christian -- cannot in good conscience confess either the filioque or the per filium as the Latins understand them, while remaining a Byzantine Christian at the same time.

God bless,
Todd

Morning, Todd.

I too am an eastern Catholic and, as I take my cue from Metropolitan John, depending on what meaning(s) I attribute to the Latin understanding of the teaching concerning filioque, I certainly can in good conscience profess the Creed in either the Greek or the Latin form and not be violating the teachings of either, and in fact that is precisely what I do.

Mary

You must follow your conscience, and I must follow mine.

That said, I cannot in good conscience say that the filioque is true, because to do that would be to repudiate the Byzantine tradition.

I believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds (ekporeusis) from the Father alone, and that He receives His subsistent being and co-essential nature only from the Father, and not from the Son. The Son is not a cause, principle, or source within the Godhead, because these properties belong only to the Father as person (hypostasis) (cf. St. Maximos' "Letter to Marinus").

Finally, I believe that the Spirit shines forth through the Son as energy, but not as person, and this manifestation of the Spirit signifies the consubstantial communion of the three divine persons.

God bless,
Todd

P.S. - Even when I attend a Latin Church (which is rare these days) I do not recite the creed with the filioque.

Mary,

I think that it is unfortunate that the representatives from the east didn't have a better reply to the latin delegation. But sometimes it is possible to intuit that something is wrong without being able to give the explicit reasons why.

I think that Archbishop Zizioulas and Todd have articulated clearly the kind of response that would have been good at Lyons II. It seems clear to me that Archbishop Zizioulas is saying that we Orthodox do not hold that the Son can be any kind of primary or secondary cause of the procession of the Spirit. The procession of the Spirit has to do with the Holy Spirit's manifestation to us through the Son. The Father gives the Spirit to the Son so that the Son can manifest the presence of the Spirit to us. This occurs in the economy of salvation and is not an essential hypostatic relation from all eternity.

Joe

The term "cause", when applied to the Father, indicates a free, willing and personal agent, whereas the language of "source" or "principle" can convey a more "natural" and thus impersonal imagery (the homoousios was interpreted in this impersonal way by several people in the fourth century). This point acquires crucial significance in the case of the Filioque issue.

In the Byzantine period the Orthodox side accused the Latin speaking Christians, who supported the Filioque, of introducing two Gods, precisely because they believed that the Filioque implied two causes--not simply two sources or principles--in the Holy Trinity. The Greek Patristic tradition, at least since the Cappadocian Fathers, identified the one God with the person of the Father, whereas, St. Augustine seems to identify Him with the one divine substance (the deitas or divinitas).

It is of course true that, as the Vatican document points out, the Fourth Lateran Council excludes any interpretation that would make divine substance the source or cause, of the Son's generation and the, Spirit's procession. And yet the Cappadocian idea of "cause" seems to be almost absent in the Latin theological tradition.

If there is no real distinction between the energies of God and God's essence, then it becomes difficult to see how God could enter into time and exist within creation without destroying, or absorbing, creation into himself.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine - viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above (Q4, A2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (Q4, A3), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctrina Christiana i,32), "Because He is good, we are."

With that, please carry on gentlemen.

Indigo