www.byzcath.org Forums General Discussions Town Hall Autonomy of the UOC-MP

The Year of the Great Jubilee
[1020th Anniversary of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus]

11.08.2008, [RISU]

Yurii Chornomorets, Candidate of Philosophical Science.

Lately the mass media of the Russian church is flooded with alarming articles about the future autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church[-Moscow Patriarchate, UOC-MP]. Everything that is taking place in Ukraine's church sphere during the year of the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Kyivan Rus is interpreted as steps to a split of the
UOC[-MP] from the Moscow Patriarchate [MP]. In truth, Russians are irritated by the freedom, dignity and maturity of the UOC[-MP], which became unexpectedly apparent for them as a church which really "uses the rights of broad autonomy" and is prepared for everything, including autocephaly.

The broad autonomy of the UOC[-MP] for 18 years

In 1990 Moscow Patriarch Alexis granted the tomos for the UOC[-MP], according to which the UOC[-MP] was an independent church which enjoys broad autonomy inside the Moscow Patriarchate. The double meaning of the formulation was done with a future aim, because it is one thing to have rights and another to use them. One always has rights, but uses them from time to time. However, the formulation suited both sides. The UOC[-MP] had to use broad autonomy up to the time of an approaching autocephaly, according to one group, or up to the time of
the [re-]joining of Ukraine to Russia, according to the other group.

In 1992 they didn't dare to abolish the once given tomos and the temporary status became permanent. The episcopate of the UOC[-MP] felt themselves part of the bigger corporate body of the bishops of the ROC [Russian Orthodox Church], and the faithful of UOC[-MP] were content with canonical union with Moscow. National independence was something new for the bishops and faithful, and it was not easy for them to get
accustomed to it. But after 18 years it has finally happened on
various levels, with the exception of a small group of marginal people who loudly make themselves known by various kinds of actions for a modest payment or even for free.

In addition, eschatological opinions blew over in the UOC[-MP]. From 1988 to 2000 a readiness for an approaching "last battle" was constantly sensed. Initially many people interpreted Chornobyl as "the Wormwood star" from the Book of Revelation of St. John the Divine. Then they saw the signs of the approaching anti-Christ in the "goods"
coming with the Western way of life. But gradually this sensitiveness
became dull, and not without the help of the clergy themselves. If
frightened many times in vain, people cease believing. For example,
nothing special happened because of the visit of the Pope of Rome. For
sure there was neither the end of the world nor an increase of
Catholic parishes. Nothing happened because of the shift of the seat
of the head of the [Ukrainian] Greek Catholic Church to Kyiv. Also,
nothing happened when Viktor Yushchenko became president. And now
threats about the end of the world as a result of violating the status
quo in Ukrainian Orthodoxy don't frighten anybody. Perhaps there will
be a few hardships, but the country is independent, we constantly have
demonstrations against NATO, against everything Ukrainian and
European. And nothing [happens]. This mean nothing is changing because
of it.

So, 18 years were enough to change the attitude of minds. Of course,
Russia tried to mobilize all and sundry, but only certain people can
live in a state of mobilization for 18 years, and they are not quite
adequate personalities. All normal people got tired long time ago.
Without mobilized readiness the UOC[-MP] is not the fifth column for
Russia, but a suitcase without a handle.

The new face of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [UOC-MP]

For a long time the officials of the UOC[-MP] were an icon of
faithfulness to the great idea of canonical status. There existed only
one answer to all suggestions of discussion about the future of
Ukrainian Orthodoxy: let them come back, we might forgive them and
maybe afterwards we will think about it. A radical change of tone was
incredible, revolutionary and reassuring for many people. Somehow it
is forgotten at once that these are only words, gestures, fiction.

The turn to a new public image of the UOC[-MP] is connected with a whole number of processes. First of all, the unfaithfulness of the Moscow Patriarchate to the "great idea of canonical status." Unity with those abroad [the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, ROCA] occurred by means of achieving unity without repentance and reconsideration of a long-term ideological war. But in their time [the ROCA] were
fighting with the Moscow Patriarchate much more heavily than
contemporary Ukrainian autocephalists. From the unity of the MP with the ROCA a conclusion logically followed: unity without an actual repentance is possible even after all anathemas and ideological wars. If it is allowed for the Russian president to promote union, the MP
can't see in the efforts of the Ukrainian president only "intervention in the internal affairs of the church"; the possible unity of Ukrainian autocephalists with Constantinople with repentance is better and "more canonical" than the unity of [the ROCA] with the MP without repentance.

It is impossible at the same time to show the extreme concessions for [the ROCA] and to be excessively strict regarding Ukrainian autocephalists. Therefore, a change in the public image of the UOC[-MP] became inevitable. Otherwise, the UOC[-MP] was threatened with losing its image completely. The new rhetoric by itself does not oblige anything, but it is pleasing for many: for the autocephalous, the Ukrainian state, and the bishops of the UOC[-MP] themselves. A
feeling of imputability and humaneness inspires.

It was said before that dialogue is not possible; now we can say that it is possible. But dialogue can be carried on for years and decades. It was said before that we are for unity with Russia; now we can say that we are Ukrainian patriots and for its unity. It was said before that we are against the Ukrainian language in church services; now let us say that it is up to the parishes. It was said before that it is necessary to approach schismatics with all the strictness of church canons; now we can declare the possibility of indulgence.

The real policy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [UOC-MP]

The change of public image is occurring at the same time as the
resolution of the most important intrinsic problem of the UOC[-MP]:
the problem of its controllability by the episcopacy. The bishop was
always the ruler of his eparchy as the priest was the ruler of his
parish. Their actual independence was always limited by the freedom of
the hierarchy to displace them. A chain of acts during the last years,
displacements of bishops, dividing eparchies, appointments of young
bishops for many important chairs, considerably raised their
controllability by the head of the church. The dismissal of Bishop
Hippolyt, famous because of his Russian hyper-patriotism, was a
separate important step. He had to be not only displaced but also be
retired, as he did not recognize the authority either of the head of
the UOC[-MP] or the Moscow patriarch and had his own opinion about
ecumenism and church policy.

Subordination to the episcopacy has been a problematic question for
the Union of Orthodox Citizens of Ukraine for a few years now. At the
beginning of its existence this organization equally keenly fulfilled
the wishes of the UOC[-MP] and Moscow. But gradually the Union of
Orthodox Citizens became more and more independent and less and less
subordinated to the head of the UOC[-MP]. Criticizing its functioning
became a considerable step to strengthening the controllability of the
church. In the church there should be only one authoritative
controller of the observance of the canons: this is the episcopate.
Independent lay organizations which criticize the bishops can't exist
in the church. If at the end of 2007 there would have been also a
Ukraine-Loving Union of Brotherhoods, it would have been condemned as
well. The church needs only those lay organizations which will
fluctuate together with the general line and not by themselves.

Ejection of the UOC[-MP] from the Moscow Patriachate

The creation of a new public image for the UOC[-MP] and the growth of
its controllability by the episcopacy and head of the church cannot
damage the interests of the Moscow Patriarchate. But the Moscow
Patriarchate does not want to have the UOC[-MP] as a part of it;
moreover it wants the UOC[-MP] to be similar to it in everything as a
whole. This creates difficulties, since the UOC[-MP] is the church of
another country and all its priests can't be patriots of the great
motherland.

Now the Russian patriotism itself of the MP doesn't give the UOC[-MP]
the possibility to be the sole main denomination of Ukraine, and so
undermines its missionary possibilities. Unity with the MP becomes a
formal obstacle on the way to full-fledged penetration of the UOC[-MP]
into the army, military and police branches of government, schools,
and higher educational establishments.

But the demands that the UOC[-MP] be governed like any other eparchy
in the depths of Russia and be similar in everything to Moscow
Orthodoxy are just not feasible. The UOC[-MP] has survived in Ukraine
not thanks to unity with the MP but on the contrary. The demand to
give the fruits of many years of hard work to "the higher instance"
looks like mockery now.

When there was no new public image or inner healing of the UOC[-MP],
its independence was not so noticeable and didn't irritate so much.
But this was enough to accomplish a number of actions, since "the
rights of broad autonomy" turned out to be suspiciously broad. Now the
MP is looking for an occasion to shout, to blame, to "establish
order." All these serve only to eject the UOC[-MP] from the MP.

The episcopate of the UOC[-MP] have found themselves faced with a
choice between their own dignity and unity with the MP.

Anniversaries as a condition for the freedom of actions

So, the strategy of the UOC[-MP] in previous years has been aimed at
achieving the controllability of the church by its supreme authority.
Ensuring the church's controllability by its supreme authority,
struggling against a display of anarchy and disrespect to the
episcopacy, improving the educational system, and the new public image
of the UOC[-MP] are actually valuable in themselves. They gave to the
UOC[-MP] episcopacy the freedom to act in any possible direction. In
the future the UOC[-MP] episcopacy would prefer to stay in a state of
liberty. That is, having created a situation of independence in which
it is possible to turn in the direction of Constantinople,
autocephaly, an exarchate [mission diocese] which is included in the
MP and, in fact, does nothing, does not turn in reality to anybody.
This is a resemblance that the church bears to Ukrainian multivectoral
state politics: ready for everything, making advances to everyone and
staying in the same place...

The additional changes that go with freedom are connected with the
organization of the anniversary celebrations. In 2007 the 15th
anniversary of the Kharkiv Synod was extensively celebrated. It was
impossible to finish fortifying the UOC[-MP]: there were too many real
and significant steps to make. And 2008 has been declared a jubilee
year. The organizers of the anniversary celebrations hoped to increase
the respect for the UOC[-MP] in society, for the growth of the
UOC[-MP]'s influence in the political life of Ukraine, fortifying the
renewed public image of the UOC[-MP]. No abrupt steps in the direction
of independence were supposed. But the jubilee turned out to be a
convenient reason for everyone interested in changing the situation in
Ukrainian Orthodoxy.

The Ukrainian country was inspired by the example of the successful
mediating of V. Putin at the initial stage of negotiations of the
[ROCA] with the MP, which concluded with the unity of the ROCA and the
ROC. President V. Yuschchenko has made many appeals to regulate the
status of Ukrainian Orthodoxy, as the alienated position of millions
of faithful from universal Orthodoxy should arouse compassion but not
malevolence in every responsible Christian. Isn't the value of church
unity equal to the value of the unity of the various nations of the
former "Great Motherland"? It is obvious that the church unity of one
people is far more valuable for it than the unity of part of this
people with other peoples from neighboring countries.

For two decades now the MP has been saying that, without the support
of Ukrainian nationalistic politics, the autocephalous movement would
split and faithful of the UOC-KP [Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyivan
Patriarchate] and the UAOC [Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church]
would return to the MP. Every person acquainted with Ukrainian
politics knows that, in Ukraine, everything exists because of the
people and not politicians. The UOC-KP and the UAOC exist thanks to
the efforts of the people. Ukrainian politicians can only ruin
everything that they "support." If the Ukrainian government would
completely prohibit the UOC-KP and UAOC, the faithful that had once
gone from the MP would never return to it. The latter fact is also
realized by the patriarch of Constantinople. That's why after decades
of appeals to come back, his position may change to indulgence for the
already established Ukrainian church jurisdictions. And the jubilee
devised by the UOC-MP turned out to be a jubilee of great opportunities.

The UOC-KP and the UAOC today

The Ukrainian autocephaly movement today is not the same as it used to
be in 2000. The MP itself has contributed to the growth of the
ecclesiastical consciousness of the UAOC and the UOC-KP episcopacy.
After the Orange Revolution there were some difficulties in
negotiations about unity between the UAOC and the UOC-KP. There were
just a few prospects, but, nevertheless, the MP was worried: What if
suddenly on the wave of the national rise they would unite? It was
decided to distract the UAOC's attention by negotiations with the
UOC-MP. During these negotiations the episcopacy of the UAOC realized
that it should have presented a more ecclesiastical face to its
jurisdiction. There were agreed-upon documents which condemned church
nationalism, confirming the necessity of the independent existence of
Ukrainian Orthodoxy on the basis of modern Orthodox ecclesiology and
not on bare ultra-patriotism. A number of symbolic steps on the part
of the UOC[-MP] facilitated the convergence of the UAOC. Namely,
disapproval of the ideology of "political Orthodoxy" and a new tone of
the discussion about possible unification.

The episcopacy of the UOC-KP is also internally ready to move from a
national consciousness to an ecclesiastical-national one. Defending
the right to an independent Ukrainian church is the main motive of the
official documentation of the UOC-KP and the civic movements which are
supporting this jurisdiction. However, the episcopacy of the UOC-KP is
aware that to have a right and to obtain the realization of this right
in life are two different things. Real church policy can't be
substituted by declarations about having a right. And readiness had
ripened in the UOC-KP for a more flexible ecclesiastical-political
position than it used to have before. This readiness was unwillingly
provoked by the change of tone of the UOC[-MP] and the jubilee
atmosphere. Just like during the Christmas holidays everything seems
possible.

The UOC-KP and the UAOC are ready for almost everything and the
UOC[-MP] is trying to turn those jurisdictions to negotiations exactly
with the [UOC-MP] and not with Constantinople. The Synod of the
UOC[-MP] announces change in the akribeia (strict observance of the
canons) for economy (deviation from the observance of the canons for
the sake of church unity).

This change is indeed even more radical. The UOC[-MP] did not
officially recognize baptisms performed by the UOC-KP and the UAOC,
though such strictness is not foreseen by any canons. That is,
baptisms in Protestant churches were recognized, but those by
"Orthodox schismatics" were not. The promise to deviate from such
overseverity to indulgence will only serve as a sanction of the
general indulgence to the Ukrainian autocephaly movement. But it will
not provoke the joining of the UOC-KP and the UAOC to the UOC[-MP] if
the [UOC-MP] remains with the MP.

Each of the three hierarchs of the Orthodox jurisdictions realizes the
obviousness of the solution of the simple choice standing before him.
From one side, Moscow gives no autocephaly, no autonomy. Even if it
gives it, universal Orthodoxy would not recognize those formations
without Constantinople's sanction. From the other side, autocephaly or
autonomy given by Constantinople is today recognized by the majority
of Orthodox churches and in the historical perspective will be
recognized by Moscow.

The MP insists on the need for Ukrainian autocephalists to "repent for
the schism committed," namely, before it. The "schism" exists not
because of separated bishops but because of the choice of millions of
Ukrainians. And the "schismatics" may beg the Orthodox church's
pardon, the embodiment of which is rather the ecumenical patriarch and
not the ROC. And Moscow recklessly accepted [the ROCA] without any
repentance, which destroyed the significance of the well-known "main
demand for schismatics." What if they beg everyone's pardon and
someone excuses them with his power? The UOC[-MP] or Constantinople,
for example?

In general, everything has turned out to be possible. And the details
of the possible juridical justifications with the canons may be
discussed even longer. But why? Everything is possible in the year of
the Great Jubilee. It is a holiday because of the possibility of the
wonders. Any holiday is a small Easter. And everything impossible
becomes possible. It is not people but the design of God which defines
the sequence of events.

***
Let us hope that the Moscow bear will push Ukrainian Orthodoxy out of
his "common house" and urge universal Orthodoxy to accept and
recognize Holy Rus-Ukraine. Let us hope that the episcopacy of
Orthodox Ukraine has power for freedom and defense of its own and the whole church's dignity. May God help them all!

http://www.risu.org.ua/eng/religion.and.society/analysis/article;24000/

Well, I'm asking if the UGCC will voluntarily join a single Ukrainian Orthodox jurisdiction (which may very well entail a sorrowful but peaceful severance of communion with Rome in favor of communion with Constantinople, Moscow, etc.)

Was not Scythia salt and peppered with mature organic Christian communities long before the mission of Ss Cyril and Methodius?

Did [Saints Cyril and Methodius] not find Scripture translated into a Slavic tongue by St. Jerome?

Was not Liturgy also found in a Slavic tongue used by the communities along the Black Sea Cost?

W[ere] not Saint Clements’s relics revered in his subterranean cathedral before these Thessalonic(i)an natives revealed them?

Were not these Byzantine missionaries consecrated as bishops by Pope Adrian

Why is it assumed Constantinople is solely the mother of Ukrainian Christendom?

especially when used for conveyance